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Contemporary Modes and
Christian Mandate in Conflict
Resolution—Peacemaking in an
Age of Genocide1
Ambassador David Rawson

W

e stand today on the threshhold of the third Christian millennium. That era ushered in a new address to humanity’s oldest
dream: peace. Peace is what the gospel of Jesus is all about; being peacemakers distinguishes us as recipients of that good news. “Blessed are the
peacemakers,” Jesus told that crowd gathered around him on the
mountain, “for they shall be called the children of God.” It is not casually that Paul, writing to the Thessalonians, refers to God as “the Lord
of peace;” that the Common Book of Prayer offers the supplication, “O,
God who art the author of peace and lover of concord;” or, that Milton
would pen, “That He our deadly forfeit should release; And with His
Father work for us a perpetual peace.”2
The Christian mandate for peace seems clear, but making peace
these many centuries later has not been easy, and this is especially the
case in an age of genocide. Contemporary modes of conflict resolution
all have their strengths and weaknesses, so that even with the best of
intentions, knowing how to make a peaceable difference—even working through the means of state diplomacy—is an elusive venture. We
are as those who cry, “Peace, Peace, when there is no peace,” who
proclaim, “Peace and security; then sudden destruction comes upon
them” (Jeremiah 8:11; I Thessalonians 5:3). I remember taking my
young niece and nephew to hear President Kennedy deliver the commencement address at American University, June 10, 1963. We sat on
the hill overlooking the athletic field below and heard these words
echo off the University buildings:
What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on
the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave
or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace, the
kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that
enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better
life for their children—not merely peace for Americans but peace for
20
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all men and women—not merely peace in our time but peace for
all time.3
But then, Kennedy continued, “I speak of peace because of the
new face of war.” The face of war, however, has even changed since
President Kennedy spoke those words four decades ago. We no longer face mutually assured destruction by two Superpowers. The “new
face of war” is civil strife, ethnic conflict, violence visited by states on
their own people, and terror directed against innocents—typified
most tragically by the recent genocidal wars of central Africa. These
are the issues peacemakers face now; but how do we carry out the
Christian mandate to be peacemakers among the new faces of war
that address us in the world today? I would like to comment on four
current and prevalent modes of peacemaking seen against the context
of civil war and genocide in Rwanda, and thus evaluate the prospects
of making peace in this violent age.

Contemporary Modes

of

Peacemaking

Let it burn! There are those who claim that peace is unnatural, that
war is inevitable and that, in the natural order of things, “God is day
and night, war and peace, surfeit and hunger...all things are born
through strife.”4 Or, in a more modern rendition, “Man is being
towards death.”5 Political analysts like Luttwak argue that war is
inevitable, and that we best let local wars burn themselves out.6
Scholars like Huntington project an inevitable “war between civilizations” the “West against the rest.”7 Historians like Victor Davis
Hanson, Donald Kagan and Robert Kaplan join in suggesting that
the ancients had it right in their embrace of war, and that the best
way to deal with conflict is to let them burn themselves out.8
In Rwanda, the purport of such argumentation was to suggest
that Hutu and Tutsi were savage tribes who had fought each other
for years. War between them was purportedly inevitable—why not
just let them have it out? This view, however, is inadequate. For one
thing, Tutsi and Hutu were not perpetually hostile groups, but
rather, they lived in a fairly stable social and economic symbiosis for
several centuries. Granted, there had been battles between royal
armies from the center against overlords at the periphery, but conflict
might just as easily have been directed against Tutsi or Hutu chiefs
within their own tribes. There is no historic referent for the mass
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passions and exclusive identities that fueled Rwanda’s civil war and
genocide. Moreover, giving way to a culture of conflict is neither a
solution nor a Christian strategy. While it is true that Christ prophesied that there would be wars and rumors of wars, this is a descriptive
statement, not a prescriptive one. War is not in the Divine order of
things. In God’s plan, as we are given to understand it, creative order
triumphs over chaos, light over darkness, and peace over conflict. As
Milton phrased it, “Aghast the Devil stood and felt how awful goodness is.”9
Warring for justice. Alternatively, there are those who assert that, in this
less than perfect world, we can put things to right through “just” wars.
Wars can be just, says St. Thomas, if they have a sufficient cause and
their goal is peace—the restoration of right relationships. These criteria
are clearer if war is declared, as a last resort, by a competent authority
against an invading external authority: “contra extraneos et hostes.”
Further ethical qualifications include the following: engaging violence
only as a last resort and with a reasonable hope for success, claiming no
monopoly of justice, and planning no actions incommensurate with the
good to be achieved. In just war theory, the end justifies the means.
These criteria become especially blurry, though, in cases of insurrection and internal repression.10 In Rwanda we had an established
government fighting an insurgent force, which in 1990 originated
outside the country but claimed a legitimate place within it. The government argued the justice of self-defense; the insurgent force, the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), argued the justice of fighting against
a tyrannical regime. “Justice” thus bolstered the moral claims of both
sides of the strife. Once engaged in conflict, then, both sides used
tactics they believed necessary to further their objectives; both
harassed, detained and killed noncombatants, thus violating the cardinal principle of discrimination that is to guide conduct within a just
war.
When President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down in April 1994,
a self-appointed government of Hutu extremists launched a genocide
which turned the “in bello” criterion of proportionality on its head:
using the most reprehensible, morally repugnant of tactics (the elimination of one’s compatriots) for the most limited of objectives (holding
onto a power that was never legitimately theirs). In Rwanda, the pursuit
of power for avowedly just purposes occasioned war; the claim of just
defense during that war opened the door to genocide. Warring for jus-
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tice put Rwandans on a slippery slope to an earthly hell, but one thing

is certain: genocide cannot in any way be considered “just” warfare.
Negotiate the difference. Some peacemakers claim that war may be
stopped and peace arranged by bargaining to accommodate competing interests or to discover shared values. Whether negotiating about
the size of the pieces or the quality of the pie, “the bargaining
approach has tended to dominate in most international negotiations.”11 John Burton argues that, rather than bargaining over “who
gets what,” negotiations need to seek an integrative solution which
meets individual ontological needs for identity and security on all
sides.12 Within the nation-state system, negotiations, whether
focused on scarcity or common values, assume that “players at the
table” can represent the interests and values of their constituents and
can covenant in token of their peoples’ consent.
The Arusha peace talks between the then Rwandan government and
RPF brought negotiating teams together in the hope that they would
find common ground for accommodating their respective interests. As
an official “Observer” at the negotiations, the United States encouraged
confidence-building measures and offered up power-sharing arrangements. Non-governmental facilitators organized meetings among
Presidents of the region, attempting to broker understanding that
would provide a context for accommodation and buttress peace.13
However, neither appeals to common values, accommodation of specific interests, nor ad hoc security arrangements dealt adequately with
group ambitions in the conflict. Moreover, the negotiators, especially on
the Rwandan government side, did not fully represent the political
realities back home. Peacemaking, to be effective, must also confront
collective forces and social structures in human society. Negotiating the
differences may work sometimes, but in many cases—even with the best
endeavors of international diplomacy at work—things fall apart, and the
peace is lost.
Change the structures. There are those who emphasize peacemaking
as a collective experience. These are of two kinds: those who see the
problems in social systems as they reflect power or scarcity, and those
who see conflict rooted in cultural contests over perceptions and
beliefs. Many theorists and practitioners of conflict management
believe that if one can get the social systems proper, then peace will
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result. Luis Padilla, in a study on Guatemala, argued that, “conflicts
among individuals are not of prime concern in peace research.”14 For
Padilla the problem is structural, emblematic of a liberation theology
that sees social structures as sinful, but capable of being redeemed
through revolution and restructuring.
Others, like Kevin Avruch, would argue that conflicts are deeply
enmeshed in culture perceptions about structures. Lasting peace initiatives must grapple with the cultural contexts, seeking actor-centered
understanding (emic approach) and discovering trans-cultural domains
and styles (etic approach). A cultural address should give peacemakers
a handle on social complexity, a frame for discussing social context and
a sensitivity to the attitudes of actors. Shared awareness of culturally
framed perceptions or new commitment to a common cultural project
is an essential building block of lasting peace.15
The Arusha peace negotiations looked at social and political systems, recognizing structural incompatibilities in territory, military
capability, legitimizing principles, and economic advancement (to use
Wallensteen’s schema).16 Observers urged structural reform in government and promoted the new institutions in civil society, like
human rights organizations. Power, exercised in Rwanda for 30 years
under single-party regimes, was to be shared not only among internal
political groups, but also with returning exiles. Structures of the new
power sharing were outlined in detail. The Arusha Accords ended up
being both a charter for systemic change and a blueprint of how
structures were to be modified.
While focused on structural change, neither facilitators nor actors in
the negotiations seemed particularly sensitive to cultural contexts. The
observers assumed the goal of a democratic culture enveloping an open
society. What we may have missed is how different the meanings given
to this goal were for the holders of authority on the one hand and the
exiles from power on the other. Moreover, in the process of long negotiations, new cultural contexts were being created, causing any structural changes to be outdated even before they were finalized. There
developed a new compatibility in political worldview and ethos among
those negotiating, but leaders not present at the negotiating table felt
isolated from the process, developing a complex of “otherness” that
prefigured a later recourse to genocide. In these and other ways,
simply changing the structure did not produce a peacable outcome.
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Proposals for systemic reform did not work in Rwanda. Cultural
understandings, such as they were, did not chart a map to peace.
Haggling over governmental positions or establishing common
ground in the rule of law did not forestall societal disintegration. The
Arusha Accords, earnestly and carefully negotiated over a year, collapsed within a brief period of only six months. In Rwanda, each of
our best contemporary modes of peacemaking was deficient in some
way, which leaves one with a probing set of questions. What were the
dynamics on which the peacemaking effort did not have adequate
purchase? Why did the best efforts to bring about peace by the most
powerful nation in the world fail to achieve a peaceable result? Were
we perhaps too sanguine about African societies’ vaunted capacity to
endure?
For one thing, social cohesion in Rwanda proved vulnerable and
fragile. For another, the pressures of population growth, pluralistic
politics, a deteriorating economy, and competition for power
stretched Rwanda’s “coefficient of elasticity” to its breaking point. In
this context, pushing forward a peace agreement that required major
structural change and redistribution of political and economic power
brought not peace, but civil war and even genocide.
We also misconstrued relations of force in a seemingly powerless
country. Given the purported commitment to a negotiated peace and
limited armaments of the contending sides, the UN Security Council
conceived a peacekeeping force of minimal size and mandate. It was
simply inadequate—too small to function effectively. For a while, that
force successfully separated the two armies and effectively moved
toward their cantonment and eventual integration. Agreement on the
installation of a broad-based transitional government and politically
balanced national assembly proved a more elusive goal. When
President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, extremist partisans
quickly proved that the UN force had neither the mandate nor the
materiel to counter determined opposition to the Arusha process.
Posturing about power in an arena of potential conflict then brought
tragic consequences.17
Further, we too easily glossed over the roots of conflict, which,
in the Rwandan case, were fear and loathing—fear that “the other,”
once empowered, would be a perpetual oppressor and the loathing
that comes from devaluing the one’s neighbor. Hutu and Tutsi were
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caught in a vicious playing out of superiority and inferiority feelings
toward each other, an emotional recreation of self-images generated
by diminution and demonization of the other side. Bolstered by a
peacekeeping force, surrounded by diplomatic efforts to promote
peace, leadership on both sides entertained their prejudices and envisioned an order which they would eventually dominate.18 These
images of domination, of course, made the other side feel less secure,
and perhaps rightly so.
Thus, we also underestimated the will to power and its consequences. Unwillingness to compromise blocked the installation of the transitional institutions and left Rwanda without governmental authority
when the President was killed. In the subsequent hostilities, the determination to hold on to power at all costs, even including the slaughter
of innocents, unleashed the horror of genocide. Evil, as Melville defined
it, “all that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of
things, all truth with malice in it ... all the subtle demonisms of life and
thought;”19 was at hand in Rwanda. The international effort focused
on a negotiated settlement; some Rwandans were hell-bent on holding
on to power. For these and many other reasons, our contemporary
modes of peacemaking failed miserably in Rwanda, but what of Christ’s
mandate to be peacemakers?

Back

to

Christ’s Mandate

In the face of these difficulties and unattractive outcomes, one is tempted to pull back and take the realist perspective, “Let wars burn out.” But
God commands us to live at peace with all humanity; to promote justice
in caring for the fatherless, the hungry, the thirsty, and the imprisoned;
to forgive our offending brothers and pray for our enemies. (Romans
12:18; Matthew 5:44; 25:31-46) This call to peace, justice, and forgiveness, nonetheless leaves us with certain dilemmas.
To begin, what kind of peace are we looking for? Is it an “absence
of war,” or, as Spinoza claimed, “a union or agreement of minds.”20
Is peace coincident with the “tranquility of order…things equal and
unequal in a pattern which assigns to each its proper position,”21 as
Augustine believed? Or, is peace, as Jefferson thought, linked to liberty, and hence with “equal and exact justice to all men?”22 In
Rwanda, the Habyarimana regime provided a stable, structured order
for nearly twenty years, but it did so by enforcing social divisions
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within Rwanda and excluding significant Rwandan populations from
the national territory. Institutional justice was intended to serve the
powerful elite, not the disenfranchised masses.
So, is ordered peace a trade-off for justice, or is justice an essential
ingredient of lasting peace? That depends on what kind of justice we
seek. To take but one analysis, we might go back to Aristotle and see
justice contextually, according to type: distributive, reciprocal or corrective. One could argue that the Rwandan crisis in its inception
broke out over distributive issues of land, jobs, and educational
opportunities.23 Hobbes sees reciprocity as the core of justice, a
mutuality in which the several elements of society perceive themselves
adequately represented in the leadership and secure in their contractual relations with authority.24 The Arusha peace negotiations envisioned the Arusha Accords as establishing such reciprocal justice.
Corrective justice can be, in modern parlance, either “retributive”
or “restorative.” Retributive justice evokes the Rwandan determination, especially after the genocide, that the culture of impunity be
forever abolished. Violent offenders had to be punished, but retributive justice makes the judicial process a victor’s tool. What about
restorative justice? If genocide is, in the terms of the 1948 Genocide
Convention, “acts committed with the intent to destroy…a group,”25
what are the boundaries of the victim/group? Under a program of
restorative justice, what would be restored and to whom: to individuals who lost their loved ones, or to groups: government or private
agencies representing victims?
In a situation of tenuous peace and uncertain justice, what room
is there for forgiveness, a word that encompasses two vital social energies: truth and mercy? Forgiveness entails both admitting the truth
and accepting proffered mercy. Organized truth-telling tied to the
possibility of amnesty has become somewhat of a tool of choice in
national reconciliation efforts, whether in South Africa, Guatemala,
Colombia or, most recently, in Sierra Leone.26 But, can extending
mercy through amnesty really hurry reconciliation of a severed society
or heal wounds of genocide? At Arusha, Rwandan interlocutors were
resistant to suggestions of sub-judicial processes like truth commissions or amnesties. Amnesty brings impunity in the back door; premature pardons may exacerbate rather than heal social memories.
After the genocide, the problem of how to accommodate the requirement of justice with the necessity of social healing through forgiveness remains a vexing question.
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Do we, as followers of Christ, have something to offer in confronting these very real dilemmas? We do have a perspective on human nature
and the conflict engendered within human society that is different from
all fashions in conflict resolution. We may, by intellectual preference,
view conflict in the international arena as realists, contractualists, structuralists, just-war theorists or even pacifists. Ultimately, however, each of
these approaches interacts with people structurally rather than personally, and we are to “regard no one from a worldly point of view”(II
Corinthians: 5:16). Thus, while we are not surprised by evil and its effect
on human psychology and social structure, we are also called to lift our
eyes and the eyes of the world above it. We understand in Christ’s teaching on the Mount the effect of disparagement in setting us against our
brother and on the road to hell. From the same teaching, we acknowledge the limitations of religious practice in bringing about peace. Before
you go to the altar, first be reconciled to your brother (Matthew 5:
21-24). In that sense, peacemaking must be personal, beginning at
home before extending abroad.
We understand personal ambition and the will to power: “the lust
of the eyes, the lust of the flesh and the pride of life,” recognizing that
not as life force but as entropic, the corruption that wastes us and our
society. On the other hand, we recognize the God-given calling for
the individual and the proper goal of governance as being one and the
same: “living peaceably with all humanity.” Our prayers for those in
public service and shouldering governmental responsibility bind us in
spiritual vision to the tasks they confront (I Timothy 2:1-2; I Peter 2:
17), as their peaceable mission is also ours.
Then too, Christians have a great tradition and vocabulary for
dealing with disputes and conflicts, and we may have something to
offer that secular organizations and governments cannot. In his
peacemaking workshops, John Paul Lederach appropriates the tropes
of peace, mercy, and justice (Psalm 85) as categories for analysis and
dialogue. Richard Niebuhr saw the Cross as an analog for human suffering engendered by conflict. Volkan and Montville show the psychic
release from hatred that comes with rituals of repentance and forgiveness among enemies, even of various faiths.27 It is most natural that
there should be, in the Christian tradition, a long history of community-building and peacemaking that has evolved its own language and
techniques. After all, claiming to follow the Prince of Peace should
make a real difference in the world.

PeacemakinG in an aGe of Genocide

• 29

In this “Age of Genocide,” followers of Christ are called to care
for the victims on all sides, whether they be hungry, destitute or in
prison. We do this in Christ’s stead and for Christ’s sake. But these
are not simply empty acts of service, a laudanum for the hopeless. We
also live and we act in view of the light of God’s decisive action taken
in human history, reconciling the world through Christ’s redemptive
work. Likewise, an anticipation of the return of Christ as Lord and
healer of all gives us hope that, in all our small and unreciprocated
actions, lives will be changed and right relations restored. We are also
called to be active agents of reconciliation in the world today—perhaps making a difference as individuals in ways that surpass the
potency of governments to bring about peaceable change in the
world. This is the spiritual heart of the Quaker Peace Testimony, as
well. We join Christ in his reconciling mission not because of a desire
for success, but because we are called to be faithful to his teaching and
to his way.
In every age, and especially where genocide has reared its ugly
head, followers of Christ are called to a commitment more profound
than mere modes for resolving conflict can afford. We understand
that God is reconciling the world to Godself though Christ, and that
in Christ, “the old has gone, the new has come!” And, the same God
who has been at work in this reconciling mission has also given us the
ministry of reconciliation. It is an awesome gift and one not to be
denied. Beyond the constraints of national interest, above the call for
national benevolence, and transcending the best we know of conflict
management, “Christ’s love compels us” (II Corinthians 5:14-19) as
agents of reconciliation.
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